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The Notion of Solidarity and the Secret History of 
American Labor Law 
THOMAS C. KOHLER† 
“Few discoveries are more irritating than those which 
expose the pedigrees of ideas.”1  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What comes to mind when you hear the word, solidarity? A 
strike or a union organizing effort perhaps? The faded rhetoric of 
some by-gone people’s democratic regime? European social policy? 
The remarkable Polish social movement of the 1980’s whose 
appearance helped to bring down the Soviet bloc? Something the 
Pope wrote? The protean character of the notion of solidarity and the 
astonishing extent of its influence reveal themselves in the rich and 
diverse associations the word evokes. Nevertheless, for most of us, 
the term has a distinctly foreign if not a vaguely mysterious ring 
about it. As Nathan Glazer recently observed, “Fraternity or 
solidarity are not familiar terms for us [Americans], and it would be 
interesting to explore why.”2 
This paper attempts to respond to at least part of Glazer’s 
challenge. There is an important but little-known story behind the 
notion of solidarity, and it is high time that it be brought to the 
surface and critically examined. Despite the alien sound of the word, 
the story of solidarity is not primarily about movements, ideas and 
events that took place in the hazy past or in strange and distant 
places. The story is about us and about how an idea that migrated 
with waves of Jewish and Catholic immigrants came to play an 
immensely powerful role in shaping some of our central social and 
legal institutions. 
At the heart of this story lie two competing visions of liberty, 
and ultimately, two competing accounts of what it means to be a 
human being. The dominant account—the one most of us use to 
explain the significance of our lives to ourselves—instumentalizes 
our social ties and portrays us as sovereign, self-defining, auto-
teleological selves. The alternative to this strongly individualistic and 
atomistic account is one that emphasizes our embeddedness in and 
dependence upon social and cultural ties. In the latter perspective, 
community mediates our understandings of ourselves and the world, 
and sets (or undermines) the conditions for authentic self-rule. Here, 
community has a normative function and represents the achievement 
of shared understandings, meanings, and values. In contrast to the 
dominant account that understands liberty in terms of an 
“unencumbered self,” the latter perspective sees personal liberty and 
self-sufficiency as states realized only through our ties with others. 
 
2. Nathan Glazer, Foreword to PIERRE ROSANVALLON, THE NEW SOCIAL QUESTION:  
RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE, at ix (Barbara Harshaw trans., Princeton Univ. Press 
2000). 
 
These bonds set the conditions for our freedom. Liberty does not 
represent an individual accomplishment, but a state of being only 
cooperatively achieved and maintained. 
The notion of solidarity traces the fault lines that run through the 
foundations of our society and of modernity itself. As we shall see, 
solidarity represents a reaction to the sort of extreme and doctrinaire 
individualism that characterizes so much of Enlightenment political 
thought and the law it called forth. The word first appears in the late 
1700’s, in the wake of the French Revolution, and its use spread with 
the disruptions that accompanied the political, economic, and social 
“triple revolution” that transformed the patterns of life across the 
Western world during the Nineteenth Century. 
The emergence of the term and its subsequent development 
reflect the efforts of a dizzyingly diverse array of theorists, 
politicians, religious thinkers, and social activists to respond to what 
early had become known as the “social question.” Its appearance 
betrays a deeply-felt exigency, a recognition that a new way to 
conceive of social bonds had to be struggled toward in the 
unprecedented circumstances that people now confronted. 
In its fullest significance, the social question raises the most 
fundamental issues about human nature and the frameworks and 
possibilities for pursuing life in common. It sweeps matters 
concerning political, economic, and legal arrangements, the character 
of the family, work, and other social relationships, the role of the 
state, the place of civil society, etc. within its scope. The contests 
over these issues characterize some of the most poignant struggles of 
the Nineteenth Century, and the debates around them have involved 
thinkers as diverse as Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Herbert Spencer, Max Weber, and the holders of the 
Chair of Peter, to name but a few. Far from resolved, the disputes 
over the social question continue unabated into the present, and if 
anything they have become more pressing. We may now live in one 
world, but how we should understand the character of our oneness in 
this world—where our contacts to one another edge ever-closer—
remains tragically and dangerously unclear. 
Solidarity sometimes seems to have as many meanings as it has 
users. To Europeans at least, solidarity not only constitutes one of the 
“indivisible, universal values”3 on which the European Union is 
founded, but also represents a body of substantive rights that the 
constitution will guarantee.4 Solidarity also constitutes one of the 
 
3. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004 O.J. (C310) 41 
(“The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union.”). 
4. Title IV of  Part II sets forth, at a fairly high level of abstraction, the rights solidarity 
encompasses. See id. at ¶¶ 87-98, at 47-49. Proclaiming solidarity a constitutionally 
guaranteed right is one thing. Determining in what solidarity might actually consist is 
another. On this theme, see the thoughtful essay by a former member of the German 
 
core values of the labor movement, both in the United States and 
elsewhere. The term evokes the attitudes of unity, fraternal concern, 
and the “one for all and all for one” spirit of bondedness that form 
the foundation for any flourishing association or stable society. In 
many respects, solidarity serves as the contemporary replacement for 
the specifically civic form of friendship that the pre-moderns 
regarded as a requisite for any sort of political community because it 
sets the stage for personal excellence and willing co-operation.5 
The present paper is a work-in-progress, and part of a larger 
project investigating the impact of the notion of solidarity on 
American and European law, in light of some of the concerns 
mentioned above. To some degree, at least, unions and labor law are 
familiar institutions to Americans. Consequently, they provide a 
good place to begin a discussion of the meaning and impact of the 
notion of solidarity. 
II. THE CURIOUS CHARACTER OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
There is something undeniably strange about the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”).6 A primary goal of the Act is to establish a 
legal structure through which employees can gain a voice in 
managerial decisionmaking. The scheme of employee participation 
that the Act establishes, however, runs contrary to nearly all of our 
expectations. In a legal system largely obsessed with the protection 
and promotion of individual choice, the Act paradoxically and 
consistently restricts it. A cornerstone of the statutory scheme, the 
Act’s exclusivity principle makes the union chosen by the greater 
share of employees the exclusive representative of them all.7 
Majority rule displaces personal preference in all matters concerning 
wages and working conditions. Once the majority has designated a 
bargaining representative, the statute strictly forbids any form of 
individual or minority dealing. This is not law for the Marlboro Man 
or for the lone pioneer striking out on his or her own. Here, the group 
enjoys priority. 
Few would associate rigidity with American society or with its 
institutions. A willingness to experiment and an eagerness to try new 
things goes hand-in-hand with the sort of individualism that 
characterizes American life. Once again, however, the Act confounds 
 
Constitutional Court, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Grundlagen europäischer Solidarität, 
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG ), June 20, 2003, at 8. 
5. The seminal formulation of this point can be found in Book 7 of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and it would remain a core theme of political thought until the time of 
Machiavelli and Hobbes. 
6. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000). 
7. See 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (2000). For explication, see Emporium Capwell Co. v. 
Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
 
our reasonable anticipations. Out of the many possible means for 
affording employees a voice in workplace decision-making, the 
NLRA sanctions only one: collective bargaining. It accomplishes this 
through the statutory requirement that any body through which 
employees participate in managerial decision making be structurally 
independent of the employer.8 This represents a carefully considered 
if highly controversial choice that lies at the very core of the NLRA. 
Regardless of employee sentiment, the Act broadly forecloses the use 
of participative schemes not anchored by and approved through a 
union. Consequently, in the absence of a collective bargaining 
representative, an employer’s use of employee participative devices 
such as quality circles, semi-autonomous work teams, and even 
safety committees is almost always unlawful or arguably so.9 
The labor law regime of no other legal system operates in this 
fashion. In German and Japanese law, for example, unions represent 
and have the authority to bargain only on behalf of their own 
members. The terms of the agreements that their unions make apply 
only to those employees who have accepted membership. Moreover, 
both systems permit individuals to bargain more favorable terms for 
themselves than those provided in the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Such arrangements are widespread in Germany. 
Likewise, in both nations, plural unionism in the workplace is 
possible, and particularly in Japan, not uncommon. A mandatory 
system of representation such as ours would violate an individual’s 
associational freedoms under the German Constitution,10 a problem 
that our Supreme Court, when directly confronted with the issue, 
nervously but scrupulously avoided.11 Nevertheless, despite their 
many and striking differences, placing the American and German 
schemes of employee representation into comparative perspective 
reveals some surprising and almost entirely overlooked connections 
between the two. 
The NLRA appears to present an unusual case of American 
exceptionalism. Not only does the Act have unique characteristics 
that sharply distinguish it from the labor relations law schemes of 
other nations, but its terms do not fit well within the American legal 
pattern either. It represents the only place in our highly-
individualistically oriented legal system where the law seeks to 
protect and enhance the status of the individual through the 
formation and maintenance of freely-formed and autonomous 
associations. From nearly any vantage point one chooses to consider 
it, the NLRA represents something of an eccentricity. It is the legal 
 
8. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(2); see NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 
U.S. 241 (1939). 
9. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992). 
10. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG][Constitution] art. 9, abs.3; id. at art. 12. 
11. See, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
 
version of odd man out. 
How can this be? What accounts for the peculiar character of the 
NLRA’s scheme of employee participation in managerial decision 
making? 
III. SOLIDARITY AND THE “UN-AMERICAN” CHARACTER OF 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
Writing in the early 1930’s, and some years before the 
enactment of the NLRA, the labor economist and historian, David J. 
Saposs, declared that  
The significant and predominant role of the Catholic Church in shaping the 
thought and aspirations of labor is a neglected chapter in the history of the 
American labor movement. Its influence explains, in part at least, why the 
labor movement in the United States differs from others, and why it has 
become more and more reactionary.12  
 In the mid-1990’s, the Swedish comparative law scholar, 
Reinhold Fahlbeck, published a provocative essay in which he 
reflected on “the un-American character of American labor law.”13 
This law, argued Fahlbeck, with its emphasis on collective action and 
on the formation of associations stands in such stark contrast to the 
attitudes of the “archetypal American” as to make the law appear, as 
Fahlbeck put it, “somehow un-American.”14 From the viewpoint of 
the average American, Fahlbeck observes, “Those people who want 
and need concerted action and unions are not quite reliable. They are 
not like Americans-at-large.”15 
Understood in the way he is using the term, Fahlbeck has hold 
of something important. Our labor law and the institutions that 
support it do rest on understandings that lie outside the American 
mainstream, and precisely for the reasons that Saposs so long ago 
noted. Exact numbers are difficult to determine. Historically, 
however, rates of union membership among Catholics (and Jews) 
have been vastly out of proportion to their representation in the 
American population. This disproportionality becomes even more 
pronounced when the representation of these groups in union 
leadership positions is considered. In the United States at least, the 
labor movement has been largely a Catholic phenomenon. 
 
12. David J. Saposs, The Catholic Church and the Labor Movement, 7 MODERN 
MONTHLY 225, 225 (1933). 
13. Reinhold Fahlbeck, The Demise of Collective Bargaining in the U.S.A.:  Reflections 
on the Un-American Character of American Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
307 (1994). 
14. Id. at 323-24. 
15. Id. at 326. 
 
What explains this curious fact? A facile response might be that 
Catholics and Jews, as largely poor and marginalized immigrant 
groups, readily organized themselves to improve their economic 
standing. Undeniably, there is something to this suggestion, but it 
does not go very far in explaining the traditionally heavily Catholic 
nature of the American labor movement. It is true that until 1965, 
when these trends reversed themselves, American Catholics had 
lower average incomes, held positions with lower occupational status 
and were less likely to attend college than Protestants. At the same 
time, however, Catholics always have constituted a relatively small 
minority of the U.S. population. For example, in 1935, when 
Congress passed the NLRA, just over 15 percent of the population 
was Catholic.16  Assuming for the moment that economic advantage 
acts as the chief motive for involvement in the labor movement, 
Catholics hardly constituted the only portion of the population with a 
substantial self-interest in unionizing. Nevertheless, non-Catholics 
consistently have proved considerably less inclined to organizing 
themselves. 
If economic interest does not explain the Catholic character of 
the American labor movement, what does?  Two factors, I believe, 
are crucial. The first concerns the manner in which Catholics 
understand the character of community, while the second relates to 
the Church’s social teaching tradition and the consistent support it 
has given to organized labor and collective bargaining.17 Once again, 
there seems to be something rather unexpected here. What made one 
of the most socially conservative of institutions, the Catholic Church, 
such a staunch supporter of unions and the practice of collective 
bargaining? Further, how and in what ways did the Church’s social 
teachings come to exert an influence upon the shape of the American 
labor law scheme? 
Lord Wedderburn reminds us that “the language of a labour law 
system can be learned only from its social history, above all the 
history of its labour movement. Without a smattering of that 
vocabulary comparative conversation is impossible.”18 In anyone’s 
 
16. THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., THE FIRST MEASURED CENTURY:  AN ILLUSTRATED 
GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900-2000 111 (2001) (collecting data sources). Even today, 
and after a period of substantial growth during the past thirty years, Catholics still make-up 
less than a quarter of the Country’s population. 
17. This body of teaching is most authoritatively expounded in the Papal social 
encyclicals, a line that begins with Leo XIII’s influential Rerum novarum of 1891 and 
continues into the present day. Encyclicals devoted largely to the themes of work and 
economic arrangements include Quadragesimo anno (1931), Mater et magistra (1961), 
Laborem exercens (1981), Solicitudo rei socialis (1987), and Centesimus annus (1991). For 
an authoritative summary of the social teachings, see the recently published PONTIFICAL 
COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, CATHOLIC CHURCH, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL 
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH, (Liberia Editrice Vaticana 2004). 
18. Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, The Social Charter in Britain—Labour Law and 
Labour Courts?, 54 MOD. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991). 
 
vocabulary, few terms probably bear a closer association with the 
labor movement than does the word solidarity. For many Americans, 
the terms “solidarity” and “forever” seem inexorably bound, even 
though most of us never learned the rest of the words to this rousing, 
old trade-union hymn. Solidarity is the glue that binds the movement 
and without which it cannot survive. It also represents a term with 
considerable political, social, and religious significance as well. 
Given our lack of familiarity with it, a short history of a complex 
concept is in order here. 
IV. SOLIDARITY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A COMPLEX NOTION 
A.  The Social Question and the Rise of the Notion of Solidarity 
Solidarity, it turns out, is a rather new word. Born out of the 
chaos that followed in the wake of the French Revolution, the term 
quickly migrated throughout the industrializing West, drawn along in 
the backdraft created by the collapse of long-standing relational 
structures and the gaping voids they left. Those first employing the 
term had plucked it from the Roman law, where a solidary obligation 
refers to a matter in which two or more people are entitled to or 
liable for the whole of a debt. 
Although Napoleon Bonaparte is said to have coined the term,19 
no one characterized the social question earlier nor more memorably 
than Edmund Burke. In the face of the forces then being unleashed, 
Burke warned that the “little platoons”20 that gave society its 
structure would “crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and 
powder of individuality, and at length be dispersed to all the winds of 
heaven,”21 leaving men “little better than the flies of summer.”22 This 
is the era in which the term “civil society” first emerged and in 
which Alexis de Tocqueville, among others, famously began to insist 
upon the importance of associations as a crucial means for securing 
the well-being of individuals and democracies alike. 
In matters dealing with intellectual or social transformations, 
identifying the moment when everything changed normally is 
impossible.. Such events typically steal upon us step-by-step and 
identifying the point at which everything became new is a bit like 
attempting to peg the point at which orange turns to red. That is not 
the case with the wholesale upending of social relations that Burke 
 
19. See 5 DAS WISSEN DES 20.JAHRHUNDERTS:  DAS DEUTSCHE BILDUNGS-LEXIKON IN 
SECHS BÄNDEN, 654-55 (Institut für Bildung und Wissen 1965). 
20 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 53 (Thomas 
H.D. Mahoney, ed., Bobbs-Merrill (1955) (1790). 
21 Id. at 109 
22. Id. at 108. 
 
decried. 
The labor was a long one, and the birth pangs sharp, but 
modernity, with its thematic insistence on autonomous 
individualism, arrived during the night of Tuesday, August 4, 1789. 
François Furet comments that this  
“is the most famous date in French parliamentary history: it marks the 
moment when a juridical and social order, forged over centuries, composed 
of a hierarchy of separate orders, corps, and communities, and defined by 
privileges, somehow evaporated, leaving in its place a social world 
conceived in a new way as a collection of free and equal individuals subject 
to the universal authority of law.”23  
Before this night had passed, “the whole structure of the old society 
came tumbling down: not only feudal dues but the whole social order 
defined in terms of collectivities granted certain privileges” had been 
swept away.24 The first sentence of Article 1 of the “August 
Decrees” that effectuated the spirited declarations made that evening 
says it all: “The National Assembly entirely destroys the feudal 
regime.”25 The venerable intermediary structures and bodies that 
anchored one’s place in the world, and that screened the individual 
from the power of the sovereign and its law, simply were obliterated. 
Just as Martin Luther had understood the relationship between 
the soul and its Creator as directly confrontational and unmediated 
by institutions, tradition, or the community of believers (both living 
and dead),26 the new regime declared every individual equal and 
autonomous and brought each of them into a direct and 
unintercessoried relationship with the authority of the newly 
imagined state. The law now applied directly to each individual and 
not mediately through the social body of which they previously had 
been a part. Formally, at least, the August Decrees removed all 
debilities. Henceforth, “All citizens, without distinction as to birth, 
can be admitted to all employments and ecclesiastical, civil and 
military dignities, and no useful profession shall constitute 
 
23. François Furet, The Night of August 4 in A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 107, 107 (François Furet & Mona Ozouf eds., Arthur Goldhammer, trans., The 
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1989). Furet continues:  “The debate of August 4, 
1789, held at night, was in fact associated with a very powerful feeling in all the deputies 
that they were witnessing twilight and a dawn.  But even this classical simile cannot do full 
justice to the emotions of the participants in this celebrated session, who for a few hours felt 
as though they were virtually divine mechanics helping to bring about this incredible 
spectacle. This twilight and dawn were their work.” 
24. Id. at 110. 
25. Décret Relatif a L [sic] Abolition des Privilegès, August 11, 1789, 8 ARCHIVES 
PARLEMENTAIRES 397. 
26. On these points, see PAUL VIGNAUX, NOMINALISME AU XIVE SIÈCLE (1948). 
 
derogation.”27 The ability of individuals freely to enter any 
occupation “consecrated the equality of individuals before the law, a 
condition of their union with the nation.”28 In a direct reversal of the 
old order, the newly unencumbered individual was free to do 
anything not directly forbidden by the law. The ground for an 
egalitarian society of sovereign individuals who would act as the 
autonomous source of their own meaning had been established. The 
foundations of the world had shifted. 
B. The Liberal Prejudgment: Why We Distrust Associations 
i. Relational Society and the “Corporate Lifestyle” 
The stunning events of August 4th may have come as a surprise 
to many members of the National Assembly,29 but that does not 
mean that they were not carefully planned. A small group of about 
one hundred deputies of the Third Estate, known as the Breton Club, 
had met secretly throughout the night of August 3rd  and “resolved to 
use a kind of magic, a temporary suspension of the Constitution to 
destroy all privileges of classes, provinces, cities, and corporations. It 
was with this intention that we entered the hall” of the National 
Assembly on the following evening.  “Our committee alone was in 
on the secret.”30 
Because the abolition of the corporations constituted a key part 
of this program of thoroughgoing reform, it is appropriate to say a 
word or two about them here. To us, the term corporation suggests a 
very specific form of limited liability business organization, owned 
by shareholders, that enjoys special powers and immunities not 
available to other forms of business associations. In the usage of the 
time, however, the term had particular reference to the guilds and 
related associations, the traditional bodies through which the 
professions, trades, and most occupations were organized.31 The 
overlapping structures of these associations or “universities”32 of 
 
27. 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 23, at 398. 
28. Furet, supra note 21, at 110. 
29. The deputies to the National Assembly had been considering the text of the Rights 
of Man, but the rapidly spreading rural uprising, known as the Great Fear, forced the 
deputies to turn their attention to responding to this emergency. See 8 ARCHIVES 
PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 23, at 339-43. 
30. Furet, supra note 21, at 108. See also Spiros Simitis, Die Loi le Chapelier:  
Bemerkungen zur Geschichte und möglichen Wiederentdeckung des Individuums, 22 
KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 157, 160 (1989). 
31. Adam Smith observes that “[r]egulated companies resemble, in every respect, the 
corporations of trades so common in the cities and towns of all the different countries of 
Europe.” ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 733 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., vol. 2 LibertyClassics 1981) (1776) 
[hereinafter II WN]. 
32. Smith notes that the incorporated trades “were antiently called universities; which 
 
masters, which often dovetailed with statutorily established norms,33 
formed a comprehensive regulatory framework that gave them 
influence over nearly every aspect of economic life by permitting the 
guilds substantial control over the conditions of competition. The 
administration of apprenticeships by the guilds allowed the masters 
to restrict entry into the trades and to determine the number of 
openings available in the towns for those qualified to practice their 
arts. The apprenticeship corporations also determined the size of the 
skilled labor pool through their ability to limit the number of 
apprentices a master could take and to fix the number of years of 
service required of apprentices and journeymen before they qualified 
to practice their art independently. The guilds likewise possessed, 
among many other powers, the ability to set the prices for and to 
determine the range of goods a master could offer and to enforce 
standards for their quality. 
Given our contemporary predispositions, it is easy to regard 
these partial trade associations simply from an economic perspective, 
but doing so both conceals their full significance as well as the 
reasons that members of the Breton Club and like-minded liberals in 
other places so earnestly sought their complete extirpation. Properly 
understood, the guilds constituted a set of integrated “cultural 
institutions” that performed a wide range of social, educational, 
moral, religious, fraternal, legal, administrative and welfare 
functions.34 These diverse institutions sat at the center of society, 
embedding individuals within the structures of the local community35 
while forming a dense associational network that united localities, 
countries, and—not infrequently—trans-national regions through 
formal and informal ties. The English Company of Clockmakers did 
not exaggerate in their ultimately unsuccessful defense of the 
Elizabethan apprenticeship law when they claimed in a pamphlet 
issued in 1812 that the enemies of the corporations “at the same time 
 
indeed is the proper Latin name for any incorporation whatever. The university of smiths, 
the university of taylors, &c. are expressions which we commonly meet with in the old 
charters of the antient towns.” I WN at 136. 
33. In the English case, the most important enactment of this sort was the enormously 
influential Statute of Artificers, 5 Eliz. C.4 (1563) (Eng.). This far reaching statute touched 
on nearly every aspect of economic and social life, and its provisions on apprenticeships 
would remain in force until 1814. To be appreciated properly, the Statute must be 
considered in light of the extensive Elizabethan Poor Laws, with which it worked in tandem. 
As one commentator notes, the enactment of the Statute “unified the systems then in 
existence, some of which had been breaking down, and given them full legal recognition. It 
represented a shift to the state of what had previously been more a matter of local control.” 
K.D.M. Snell, The Apprenticeship System in British History:  the Fragmentation of a 
Cultural Institution, 25 HISTORY OF EDUCATION 303, 304 (1996). 
34. Cf., Snell, Apprenticeship System, supra note 31, at 306. 
35. Snell points out that guilds and apprenticeships were “intimately tied to ideas of the 
sense of place, ‘belonging,’” and in the case of England, to “poor-law entitlement.” Id. at 
307. As we shall see, the fact that these institutions discouraged labor mobility would 
constitute one of the grounds upon which Adam Smith would condemn them. 
 
condemn the whole political and commercial establishment of 
Britain; which is nothing other than a grand Corporation, composed 
of an infinity of smaller ones.”36 One commentator observes that to 
their contemporaries, corporations and apprenticeships were “so 
overladen with social and other assumptions and expectations, so tied 
to administrative, moral and political considerations, that any 
‘economic’ analysis which treated it as a distinct and separate 
activity would have been felt incongruous.”37 
Because they are so different than our own, the attitudes that 
supported the “corporate spirit” and the institutions that embodied it 
can be difficult for us to appreciate. They represent a different way 
of being and embodied a set of values and understandings that made 
life in a relational society both intelligible and possible.38 From their 
inception, the guilds represent an attempt to secure conditions for 
some degree of shared self-determination.  While they performed 
numerous regulatory and administrative tasks, these corporate 
institutions also functioned as fraternal and religious sodalities as 
well. In addition to caring for the temporal needs of their members, 
the guilds founded colleges, built churches, contributed altars, 
cathedral windows, and other memorials to their deceased members 
and families, and endowed Masses for the repose of their souls, a 
practice that continued in the Catholic regions of Europe until the 
eventual suppression of the guilds in the latter-part of the Nineteenth 
century. As one commentator characterized it: 
The Gild, which, as we have shown, stood like a loving mother, providing 
and assisting, at the side of her sons in every circumstance in life, cared for 
her children even after death . . . . In this respect, the Craft-Guilds of all 
countries are alike; and in reading their statutes, one might fancy sometimes 
that the old craftsmen cared only for the well-being of their souls . . . . We 
find innumerable ordinances also as to the support of the sick and poor; and 
to afford a settled asylum for distress . . . . The chief care however of the 
Gildmen was always directed to the welfare of the souls of the dead. 39 
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At the opposite end of the life cycle, the apprenticeship system 
sponsored by the guilds involved far more than a period of skills-
training. Lujo Brentano refers to it as “a kind of novitiate to 
citizenship.”40 In keeping with the character of the relationship, the 
candidate’s reception into an apprenticeship typically took place in a 
solemn ceremony in the town or guild hall, in the presence of the 
members, and usually on the feast day of the guild’s patron saint.41 
After hearing a recitation of the moral and practical duties pertaining 
to the relationship, an indenture was drawn and executed which 
memorialized the act and recited the special conditions under which 
the apprentice was placed with the master. The apprentice then 
became part of the master’s family. Training included not only 
instruction in the trade, but in literacy, numeracy, the management of 
a household and a business, as well as moral, religious and character 
formation.42 After completion, the apprentice then could be received 
once again into the guild and thereby become a citizen of the town. 
Most of us probably would find the restrictions on individual 
choice that accompanied such a system cloying, and for many 
unacceptable. In contrast to our views, however, historian Jürgen 
Kocka observes that 
[c]ertainly guild members themselves only very rarely would have found 
these limits as imposing a menacing dependency or as oppressively 
restrictive. No matter how much they may have treasured being the master of 
the workshop and the lord of the house, they did not aim at independence in 
the sense of a fully developed freedom of competition and a dynamism 
unburdened from the restrictions of tradition. To the trades, growth and 
accumulation, superiority and innovation did not appear worth striving after. 
Instead, they sought to secure a way of life appropriate to their place in life 
in honorable, respectful and fitting forms of work and living. The restrictions 
imposed by the guilds did not contradict the widely held ideal of the trades of 
an “honorable living.” Rather, as a rule, these restrictions were greeted as an 
important means to secure one’s living in an honorable way, through reliable 
work and a decent life, consonant with moral customs and not achieved at 
the cost of one’s fellow tradesmen. This last point is important. Formed by 
the centuries-old experience of an insufficient or only slowly growing food 
supply, members of the traditional trades—in contrast to the attitudes of the 
early merchant class—were stamped by the conviction that the advantage of 
one must come at the disadvantage of another. Not only the guild rules, but 
prevailing moral convictions forbade one from ruthlessly grabbing whatever 
chances the market offered, pursuing them to the full, and behaving like a 
capitalist entrepreneur. Defending independence was part of the comradely 
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bond of guild membership—institutionally as well as a matter of social 
morality.43 
ii. Relational Society and its Critics—Why We Distrust 
Associations 
A deep and abiding distrust of institutions of all descriptions, 
both sacred and secular, lies at the heart of modern liberalism, which 
regards them all as posing a constant threat to the status and freedom 
of the individual. This attitude of suspicion mirrors the political 
nominalism that informs the modern project and the anthropology 
that underlies it. This framework can account only for individuals. It 
regards association of whatever form either in terms of representing 
an instrumental and transient alliance among self-seeking but 
otherwise unassociated individuals, or it reifies the group (e.g., 
society) as the individual, seeing it as the place where the “I” and the 
“we” merge. In the narcissistic reverie this latter view posits, the 
individual is autonomous because the law that society imposes is 
identical with that which the individual has made. In either account, 
“partial associations” like the guilds or the myriad other institutions 
that Burke describes as society’s “little platoons” end-up being 
regarded as factions that threaten both individual freedom and social 
peace. 
The progenitor of the first account, Thomas Hobbes, pungently 
describes corporations of all descriptions as an “infirmity . . . which 
are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of the 
greater, like worms in the entrayles of a naturall man” and darkly 
warns that their existence “tend to the dissolution” of the state.44 
Hobbes’ greatest critic, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, agreed with 
him, at least on this point. In Rousseau’s view, the “general will” of 
the people “is always right and always tends toward the public 
utility.”45 Nevertheless, Rousseau warned, “it does not follow that 
the people’s deliberations always have the same rectitude.” Although 
never corrupt, the people can be fooled. “If, when an adequately 
informed people deliberates, the citizens were to have no 
communication among themselves, the general will would always 
result,” Rousseau instructed. “But when factions, partial associations 
at the expense of the whole, are formed,” the will not of individuals, 
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but only of the associations is stated. In this case, “there are no 
longer as many voters as there are men, but merely as many as there 
are associations.” As a result, “for the general will to be well 
expressed, it is therefore important that there be no partial society in 
the State, and that each citizen give only his own opinion.” Should it 
be impossible to suppress the partial societies, “their number must be 
multiplied, and their inequality prevented,” advice subsequently 
carefully attended to both by Adam Smith46 and James Madison.47 
Modernity conducted its vigorous campaign to liberate the 
individual from institutions along a broad front. One of the leading 
figures in this long march against the structures was Adam Smith, an 
influential and implacable critic of apprenticeships, the “corporation 
spirit,” and of institutions generally.48 Were he alive today, one could 
almost feature him wearing a “Rage Against the Machine” tee-shirt. 
Smith based his critique of the corporations, or what he called the 
“inequalities occasioned by the policy of Europe,” on both efficiency 
and liberty grounds. The efficiency argument was threefold. The 
policy of Europe, “by not leaving things at perfect liberty,” restrained 
“competition in some employments to a smaller number than would 
otherwise be disposed to enter them” while “increasing it in others 
beyond what it naturally would be.”49 Lastly, it obstructed “the free 
circulation of labour and stock, both from employment to 
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employment and from place to place.” 50 
Because such policies offend basic human liberty, they are 
unjust. In language firmly rooted in John Locke’s labor theory of 
property and value,51 Smith states that “[t]he property which every 
man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other 
property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a 
poor man,” he continues, “lies in the strength and dexterity of his 
hands.” Consequently, “to hinder him from employing this strength 
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his 
neighbor is a plain violation of this most sacred property.” Laws or 
other restrictions that hinder “one from working at what he thinks 
proper” and that obstruct “others from employing whom they think 
proper” constitute a “manifest encroachment upon the just liberty 
both of the workman” and those disposed to employ him.52 Justice 
lay in affording unrestricted individual choice. 
Smith’s thoroughgoing distrust of institutions leads him to make 
a series of concrete suggestions for retarding the growth and spread 
of the “corporation spirit” that makes them possible.53 “People of the 
same trade,” Smith tartly warned, “seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the publick . . . .”54 While the law “cannot hinder people of 
the same trade from sometimes assembling together,” Smith 
counseled, it should do nothing whatever to encourage their 
collaboration.55 A regulation that requires the registration of all those 
practicing a particular trade, observes Smith, simply facilitates their 
organizing. Likewise, ”[a] regulation which enables those of the 
same trade to tax themselves in order to provide for their poor, their 
sick, their widows and orphans” only conduces to give “them a 
common interest to manage” and renders their assembly necessary.56 
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Lastly, an incorporation also “makes the act of the majority binding 
upon the whole” which permits much more effective restrictions on 
trade since it precludes individuals from withdrawing and thereby 
dissolving the combination.57 
Whatever else it might represent, the Enlightenment denotes 
both a set of wide-ranging philosophical attitudes as well as an 
intellectual and social movement, centered in France, but with its 
votaries united in a conversation that stretched across Europe and 
reached deeply into the United States. As the ties among the leading 
lights of the French and Scottish Enlightenment demonstrate, the 
members of this loose sect typically had a close familiarity with each 
other’s work, and not infrequently, personal relationships with one 
another as well. In 1776, for example, the abbé Morellet, a leading 
French economic theorist, political activist, and friend of, among 
others, Adam Smith, David Hume, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin 
Franklin, wrote to his colleague, the economist Turgot, to tell him 
that the police had seized a section of the Wealth of Nations dealing 
with corporations and apprenticeships that Morellet recently had 
translated at Turgot’s behest. Because the authorities regarded the 
extract from Smith as supporting Turgot’s criticism of the 
established order, the diarist Métra wrote that “one could never get 
permission” to publish it.58 Just two years later, another of Turgot’s 
circle, Dupont de Nemours, wrote to Smith telling him that “[w]e are 
moving rapidly towards a good constitution,” and thanking him 
because “[y]ou have done much to speed this useful revolution.”59 
iii. Suppressing the Middle: The Loi de Chapelier 
The abolition of every possible mediating group represented a 
crucial part of this revolutionary effort to reconstitute society for the 
new Adam, the human reconceived in the light of reason, a concept 
itself now newly understood. Nevertheless, despite their sweeping 
character, or perhaps precisely because of it, the August Decrees did 
not explicitly do away with the guilds. That would not occur until the 
enactment of Le Chapelier’s law nearly two years later. The cursory 
summary of resolutions reached by the National Assembly on the 
night of the 4th that appears in the Parliamentary Archives mentions 
only “the reformation of the guilds,” although it might be noted in 
passing that this synopsis reads a bit like a bleary-eyed celebrant’s 
morning-after attempt to reconstruct the events of a particularly 
cheery evening. The final decree, issued after a week of complicated 
and more sober wrangling, did not refer to the guilds at all. The 
closest mention it made to them was the abolishment of “the 
particular privileges of the provinces, principalities, regions, cantons, 
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cities and communities of inhabitants.”60 
These efforts to root the middle out of society left the reformers 
with a difficult problem. It is one thing boldly to declare the 
abolishment of the feudal regime. It is another thing to determine just 
what this really means and how far the destruction job ought to go. 
The devil always lurks in the details, and the details in this case 
presented a particularly devilish dilemma. On the one hand, 
agreement existed all around that citizens had the right to assemble 
and to form associations. On the other, great concern existed that 
these associations not serve as replacements for the intermediary 
bodies and structures that the National Assembly had sought to 
abolish through the August Decrees. The needle to be threaded 
involved recognizing the right of individuals to associate with one 
another, but somehow preventing that activity from producing new 
intermediate institutions. 
Condorcet well-captured the tension between these two 
positions in his 1789 pamphlet, Declaration of Rights,61 which 
deeply influenced the final version of the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man, which the National Assembly would enact just days after its 
issuance of the August Decrees. In a section of the pamphlet entitled, 
“Dangers to the Right of Equality,” Condorcet wrote that “[a]ll 
citizens enjoy the right to form free associations, but they cannot be 
recognized as such by the power of the legislature or by the 
government.” A group of nobles, lawyers or metalworkers may form 
an association for deliberation and debate as they choose. 
Nevertheless, Condorcet continued, such groups may not assume the 
form or function of an intermediate body or a corporation. “Citizens 
in the state are divided only by districts and by officials charged by 
the citizens with public functions; each association is thus 
necessarily a private association that has the right to be free, but that 
does not have the right to act as a corporation.”62 
Consequently, “bodies of priests of different religions, a military 
corps, or the corps of jurists have no right to a political existence 
different than those of theatre subscribers or of members of a club, 
without which natural equality would be destroyed.”63 In other 
words, citizens were free to form groups, but as Spiros Simitis 
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observes, those groups would be tolerated “only as a means to the 
better preparation of individual activity.”64 The freedom to associate 
could not be employed to restore the mediating institutions that only 
shortly before had given society its structure. 
While the complete suppression of the guilds and corporations 
would not come until the passage of Le Chapelier’s Law in June, 
1791, their eventual fate, like that of other forms of mediating 
institutions, was never in doubt. “There were no intermediate stops 
on the way to the individual,”65 or on the way to the radically 
individualistic society that the reformers intended to create. The 
Declaration of the Rights of Man said nothing concerning the 
corporations, but in an accompanying enactment explicating the 
“application of the principles” set forth in the Declaration, the 
National Assembly stated in part that in order to secure the 
“blessings of liberty and the equality of rights...there are no longer 
jurandes,66 nor corporations of the professions, the arts, or the 
trades.”67 To drive home the point concerning groups and sodalities, 
the document further provided that “[t]he law recognizes neither 
religious vows nor any other engagement that would be contrary to 
natural rights or to the constitution.”68 Like Luther’s understanding 
that the relationship between God and man is unmediated by the 
Church, visible or invisible, for the new state, neither one’s religious 
community nor one’s god could come between it and the individual 
citizen. 
The National Assembly would take two cuts at addressing the 
status of the corporations before enacting Le Chapelier’s Law in June 
1791. The first came through a proposal, made by the Committee on 
Taxation in February 1791, to impose a licensing fee on persons 
practicing their trade or profession. The “moderate” fee the 
Committee proposed would replace the membership charges levied 
by the guilds and professional bodies, and thereby do away with 
them altogether. 
The Committee supported its proposal with equity arguments. 
The corporate system, it observed, imposed an indirect tax both on 
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consumers and producers. In language strongly reminiscent of Adam 
Smith’s, the Committee argued that “the right to work is one of the 
first rights of man. This right is his property . . . it is without doubt 
the first property, the most sacred, the most imprescriptible.”69 The 
proposed law would “efface these last vestiges of servitude” that the 
“tyrannical” corporate system imposed and would respect “the 
property of the citizen, and above all, the liberty and dignity of 
man.”70 The National Assembly lost little time adopting it. 
Several weeks later, the Assembly again addressed the question 
of associations when it took up a proposal, made by the Committee 
on the Constitution, to limit the right to petition the government 
strictly to individuals.71 “The right to petition is an individual right,” 
insisted the Chair of the Committee, Issac René Guy Le Chapelier. 72 
“Consequently, no corps, no administration, no society can exercise 
the undelegable right of petition,” and no petition can be made in a 
collective name.73 Le Chapelier acknowledged that individuals 
enjoyed the right to associate with one another to discuss and 
deliberate about public issues. Nevertheless, he maintained, “if the 
law offers a means for publishing the result of their deliberations, 
[such groups] soon will become a subjugating body, a menacing 
authority, a power contrary to the whole system of representative 
government,” whose views “necessarily will represent the results of 
the decisions taken by the majority” and not those of the objecting 
minority.74 
Among the most vociferous opponents of this proposal was 
Robespierre, who pointedly observed that “[t]he weaker and more 
unfortunate a man is, the more he is in need, the more he has need of 
the prayers of others.”75 The proposed law, he insisted, would injure 
the poor and the weak, who have the greatest need for collective 
action. In a voice shaking with passion, Robespierre argued that the 
proposal “is contrary to natural law, and I maintain that since each 
isolated individual has the right to petition, it is not possible for you 
to prohibit a collection of men, of whatever title or whatever name it 
carries, that you prohibit it, I say, the faculty of putting forward its 
views and addressing them” to those in power.76  Robespierre’s 
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objections, along with those raised by several other critics, including 
the Bishop of Blois and Pétion, were every bit as forceful as they 
were unavailing. The Committee’s proposal became law a few days 
thereafter. 
The final step in the movement that began on the fabled night of 
August 4, 1789 came nearly two years later with Le Chapelier’s 
introduction of his law to outlaw all “assemblies of citizens of the 
same estate or profession.”77 Speaking on behalf of the 
Constitutional Committee that formally had proposed the law, Le 
Chapelier asserted that, in spite of the August Decrees, “many 
persons” had abused the freedom to associate “to attempt to recreate 
the abolished corporations in the form of assemblies of arts and 
trades” by organizing them in the names of their officers. “Without 
doubt, the right of assembly belongs to every citizen,” Le Chapelier 
acknowledged, “but there is no right that permits citizens of certain 
professions to assemble for their pretended common interests.” Then, 
in words that could have come from the mouth of Rousseau himself, 
Le Chapelier ringingly declared, “Corporations no longer exist in the 
state; there is only the particular interest of each individual and the 
general interest. No one is permitted to inspire an intermediate 
interest among the citizens that separates them from the state through 
a corporative spirit.”78 
The true goal of these associations, Le Chapelier complained, 
had nothing to do with deliberations, but with attempts to establish 
work rules and wage rates for workers in various cities, and “to 
prevent workers and the individuals who employ them in their 
workshops from making private agreements” over such matters. The 
assemblies “had even employed violence” and “forced workers to 
quit their shops,” he asserted, to obtain compliance with their 
demands. “Already several workshops [in Paris] have risen-up” and 
various other disorders have been reported.79 Not only did these 
associations threaten public order. They also upset the principle of 
“free agreement” by which individuals are to establish the terms of 
their relationship themselves, through direct one-on-one negotiation, 
free of any form of third-party interference or intervention. 
Obstructing this freedom would lead only to a situation of “absolute 
dependence” that would push workers into privation and thereby, 
into a state “close to slavery.”80 
Le Chapelier also accused the assemblies of having used 
“specious motives” to gain permission from the authorities to 
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organize. Many of these associations, he maintained, claimed that 
they existed in part to supply aid to members of the same trade or 
profession who were ill, in need, or unemployed. Such “relief funds 
may appear to be useful,” Le Chapelier warned, “but one should 
make no mistake about this assertion.” Caring for the infirm, the 
unemployed and the needy, he insisted, is a task for the state and 
public officials, not for private bodies. The distribution of help by 
these private associations, when not made “dangerous by their bad 
administration, tends at the least to result in the rebirth of the 
corporations; it requires the frequent reunion of individuals of the 
same profession, the nomination of syndics and other officers, the 
formation of regulations” and the exclusion of those who have not 
“submitted” themselves to them.81 
To preclude the “rebirth of privileges” and “to prevent the 
progress of this disorder” which “these wretched societies” had 
spread, Le Chapelier called for the enactment of a new law, the first 
article of which embodies both the spirit of the law and of the age: 
“The destruction of all types of corporations of citizens of the same 
estate and profession being one of the fundamental bases of the 
French constitution, it is forbidden to reestablish them under any 
pretext or form whatsoever.”82 Despite questions from the right about 
the effect of the law on political clubs and other associations, and 
requests for further deliberations about the impact of the law on the 
right of association, the National Assembly quickly passed Le 
Chapelier’s proposal. The work began the night of August 4th was 
now complete. The age of the emancipated individual had begun. 
The passage of Le Chapelier’s Law also marked the end of his 
notable public career. A lawyer from Rennes, he had presided over 
the National Assembly on the night of the 4th and had played a 
leading role in many of the central events that occurred during the 
first years of the Revolution. Upon the expiration of his mandate, Le 
Chapelier returned home, but not to a quiet life. As the Revolution 
followed the increasingly violent path that Burke had foreseen, Le 
Chapelier was accused on several occasions of “moderatism,” and 
finally, of spying on behalf of England. He died on the guillotine on 
April 22, 1794, not quite three years after the passage of his 
namesake law.83 
iv. Summary and Assessment 
Both the August Decrees and Le Chapelier’s Law proved to be 
far longer-lived than the man who had played such a key role in their 
enactment. As François Furet notes, while many of the institutions 
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temporary, “the most important thing” about the August Decrees and 
Le Chapelier’s Law, “was that they survived.”84 Unlike nearly every 
other piece of legislation of the period, the latter statute remained 
unamended and only was repealed late in the Nineteenth Century.85 
The changes wrought by the “divine mechanics”86 of the 
Enlightenment spread across Europe and left no place untouched. 
Everywhere, feudal arrangements were abolished and the structures, 
practices and institutions that once had given society its form were 
razed. The creation “without concessions” and within a very short 
period of time “of a wholly modern, individualistic society,” Furet 
observes, posed a truly novel and fundamental problem. “What had 
to be worked out now,” he remarks, for this completely new “society 
of free and equal individuals” would be the sense in which those 
sovereign, independent, rights-bearing individuals might be related 
to and united with one another.87 This problem represents the very 
essence of the “social question.” 
Attempts to respond to the social question dominate the history 
of the Nineteenth Century and many of the era’s bloodiest and most 
poignant struggles were fought over it. Marxism and the many 
strains of socialism, anarchism, various forms of nationalism, 
religious and secular utopian experiments, assorted initiatives to 
replace wage labor with producer co-operatives, worker movements 
of every stripe and a variety of employer sponsored programs of 
welfare capitalism represent just some of the attempts to address the 
social question. Each of these programmatic remedies sought to 
establish a new foundation for community and to resolve the 
exigencies that the new conditions had produced. 
Despite the passage of time, the social question remains a 
pressing contemporary challenge. Once largely an American 
concern, the spread of a certain form of detached individualism now 
challenges the health of democracies everywhere. Likewise, even as 
our economies and our legal and political systems are becoming 
increasingly interdependent and globalized, the basis for our 
commonality in the still fragile and unsteadily evolving new world 
order remains unclear. The notion of solidarity stands as one of the 
most influential and significant attempt to respond to the issues that 
the social question poses. 
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V. RESPONSE AND INNOVATION: THE SOCIAL QUESTION, SOLIDARITY 
AND THE CATHOLIC CONTRIBUTION 
i. Community and the “Catholic Imagination” 
The collapse of the obsolete feudal and customary relational 
structures, the accompanying revolution in human self-understanding 
and mores, the subsequent extensions of political and economic 
rights, along with innovations in agricultural practices and industrial 
production had just the sort of atomizing and disorienting effects that 
Edmund Burke had predicted. These transformations and advances 
resulted in the formulation and extension of formal individual 
freedoms, at least to many, but they brought tremendous and 
wrenching social dislocations with them. 
Emancipated from the hierarchical structures and social bonds 
that once determined their place in life, individuals also were placed 
outside the complex set of reciprocal duties that previously had 
protected the vulnerable through the obligations that they imposed on 
the strong. Without the presence of bodies that could mediate the 
relationship between them, increasing numbers of people stood 
exposed to the growing power of market institutions and to the 
expanding claims of the newly-rising state. Many contemporary 
observers also warned that the dissolution and fragmentation of 
social ties not only threatened the possibility of democratic self-rule, 
but the proper unfolding of human personality as well. Of particular 
concern in the debates over the social question were the problems of 
the growing numbers of industrial workers. Identifying and 
developing structures that would integrate them into society, relieve 
their precarious economic status, and afford them opportunities for 
effective and authentic self-determination became the primary, if 
never the exclusive focus of the social discussion. 
Some sense of pre-Revolutionary society gives a better feeling 
for the challenges that those attempting to address the social question 
faced. Prior to the changes that occurred in the wake of the 
Revolution (changes that typically were initiated not from the 
bottom-up, but from the top-down), everyone, no matter how lowly 
their station, was woven into the social fabric and had an integral 
part in it. Historian Jürgen Kocka points out that in this social order, 
one might be “at the bottom, but included” [unten, aber einbezogen], 
and he uses the processions that traditionally accompany the 
celebration of the Catholic feast of Corpus Christi [the Body of 
Christ] to illustrate the point.88 The rich symbolism surrounding this 
feast reveals much about distinctly Catholic understandings of and 
attitudes toward community that have shaped both the notion of 
solidarity as well as the character of the American labor movement 
and American labor law. Consequently, it is worth a moment or two 
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to familiarize ourselves with its some of its meanings. 
Corpus Christi celebrates the institution of the Eucharist, the 
central sacrament of the Catholic Church. According to Catholic 
belief, the bread and wine consecrated by the priest during the Mass 
become, as the classic formulation has it, “the body and blood, the 
soul and the divinity” of Christ. To Catholics, there is nothing 
symbolic about the Eucharist.89 Instead, through their reception of it, 
the faithful understand themselves literally to be feeding on the 
divine body and blood of their Savior. In consuming the Eucharist, 
they become united with Christ to form a single body that transcends 
place and time. Consequently, the sacrament often is referred to as 
communion since it unifies the faithful, both living and dead, in one 
body, where the good of each is communicated to all the others. The 
pelican early became a symbol for Christ in the Eucharist, since it 
was thought that when the female bird lacked other food, she would 
peck at her breast and nourish her young with droplets of her own 
blood.90 
Corpus Christi embodies and represents these understandings. 
The feast falls in early summer and its celebration unfolds as a 
colorful, day-long event. In Catholic areas of Europe, towns were 
(and to a surprising extent, still are) hung with flags, banners and 
flowers to mark the day, and the squares and other public areas 
decorated with “living pictures” and with elaborate displays made of 
multi-colored soil. In older days, plays and pageant wagons 
illustrating religious themes often were part of the day’s proceedings. 
A procession with the Eucharist marks the high-point of the 
celebration, and in pre-Revolutionary Europe, also mirrored the 
community’s understanding of itself and its organic order. 
During the procession, the priest or bishop walks beneath a 
canopy while carrying before him a consecrated host ensconced in a 
glass-fronted device called a monstrance. Nearly the entire adult 
population of the town would escort him, arranged in ranks reflecting 
the marcher’s station and role in the community, and accompanied 
by musicians. As one commentator noted, “generally speaking, the 
nearer the canopy, the more honorable the place.”91 Often, the 
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canopy and the monstrance came at the rear of the procession. 
Marching before it would come the congregations of men and 
women religious, the mayor and town council, the merchants and 
traders, and then the various guilds, the masters and journeymen 
processing together, each corporate body carrying banners bearing 
the image of its patron saint and the symbol of its trade. Preceding 
them and also carrying their flags came the unskilled day-laborers, 
the shepherds and field-hands, and the town’s poor. United by the 
Eucharist, the town’s inhabitants marched as a host, with each of its 
members part of a smaller body that integrated them into the whole. 
The place of the marcher in the procession reflects their place in 
the social, political, and economic order, but two points should be 
noted. Firstly, no matter how lowly, each part of the social body 
reflected in the processional order had a dignity of its own. Further, 
the honor of place in the procession is not a sign of the individual’s 
own virtue or presumed favor in the eyes of the Deity. As Alexis de 
Tocqueville observed, “Among Catholics, religious society is 
composed only of two elements: the priest and the people.  The priest 
alone is raised above the faithful: everything is equal below him.” 
Consequently, in matters of faith and morals, “Catholicism places the 
same standard on all intellects; it forces the details of the same 
beliefs on the learned as well as the ignorant” and it “imposes the 
same practices on the rich as on the poor.” The faith “compromises 
with no mortal, and applying the same measure to each human, it 
likes to intermingle all classes of society at the foot of the same altar, 
as they are intermingled in the eyes of God.” For these reasons, 
Tocqueville adds, “If Catholicism disposes the faithful to obedience, 
it does not therefore prepare them for inequality.  I shall say the 
contrary of Protestantism, which generally brings men much less to 
equality than to independence.”92  The differences between the two 
attitudes illustrate the effects of what the sociologist Andrew Greeley 
calls “the Catholic imagination.”93 
The rise of the notion of solidarity represents an effort to find 
substitutes for the integrated and compact social unity that the 
Corpus Christi procession once mirrored. The term suggests 
elements that its proponents found missing from the new order: a 
sense of unity and indivisibility, a recognition of individual 
interdependence and mutual obligation, a basis for co-operative 
relationships, an acknowledgement of duty of society toward its 
weakest members, the creation of conditions for the development of 
networks of small groups and associations through which 
individuals—and particularly the less strong—could gain concrete 
and significant opportunities for self-responsibility and self-
determination. These things once formed the ingredients of the 
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specifically political form of friendship that the ancients viewed as 
necessary to the maintenance of a flourishing polity. In the post-
Enlightenment world, however, a coolly rational self-interest had 
supplanted the more optimistic idea of friendship as the basis for 
society. As Tocqueville commented, in this “world altogether new” 
the “instinctive love” that once bound people to their country and 
their fellow citizens, and that motivated “disinterested” and at times 
heroic efforts to secure their well-being “is fleeing away without 
return.”94 A new word and a new sentiment had to be found to 
replace the old. For many, solidarity would come to be that 
substitute. 
ii. Assessing the Catholic Contribution 
Solidarity is a true florilegium, a collection of the ideas, 
experiences, reflections and insights of diverse individuals and 
groups across various places and times.95 Prominent among those 
responsible for germinating, cultivating, and propagating the idea, 
however, has been a group of thinker-activists whose work makes-up 
an essential part of what now is known as the Catholic social thought 
tradition. From the start, those working in this tradition have played a 
leading role in working-out both the notion of solidarity and the 
practical means for its realization as they attempted to address the 
social question. As the political theorist, J.E.S. Hayward, notes, “it 
was amongst the Roman Catholic social theologists . . . that the idea 
of solidarity first achieved its pivotal social significance and 
underwent an evolution that prefigured its subsequent philosophic 
prominence and temporary political preeminence.” In Britain, 
Hayward continues, “Feudalism and Catholicism had been 
eliminated as major politico-social forces by the early nineteenth 
century.” In France (and in the Western and Southern regions of 
Germany), however,  
Roman Catholicism remained an immensely powerful opponent of the 
individualist ideas that had swept all before them almost unopposed in 
Britain. It is therefore comprehensible that . . . the Church should have 
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initially become the rallying point for anti-individualism and that the appeal 
to solidarity should take the form of a campaign for a return to its politico-
social constitution, even when its spiritual message had been rejected.96 
VI. SOLIDARITY AT WORK: THE SOCIAL THOUGHT TRADITION 
AND AMERICAN LABOR LAW  
Writing in 1861, one of the most notable figures in the social 
tradition, Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler, captured the 
disorientation and uncertainty that permeated the era, and the 
challenge to which the social tradition would seek to respond. “We 
are standing at the end of a time,” he observed, “in which all the old 
dwellings that our Catholic forebearers had furnished have been 
razed, and where we Catholics have not yet quite sorted out how we 
should take-up residence in the new order of things.”97 Like many 
others, Ketteler would devote much of his life to puzzling out 
effective means to allow people to take up their home in a “world 
altogether new.” 
What those active in the social thought tradition proposed as 
concrete solutions to the social question as it implicates economic 
arrangements, legal institutions and working-life took an astonishing 
variety of forms that evolved over time. From the beginning, 
however, proposals to afford workers status, participation in and 
responsibility for decisionmaking constituted a core part of their 
agendas. For example, as early as 1819, the romantic social critic, 
political economist and early Catholic social theorist, Adam Müller, 
called for the creation of a “reliable station in civil society” for the 
rising body of property-less workers then living on the shadowy 
periphery of what was still a class-based society, and affording them 
legal rights that would put them on a footing equal to that enjoyed by 
independent, middle-class citizens. Fifteen years later, Franz von 
Baader, another early contributor to the social-thought tradition, 
attempted to concretize some of Müller’s program by advocating the 
creation of a new legal framework that would have provided for the 
right of workers to be represented in the parliaments of the estates 
(Ständeversammulungen) and to participate in decisionmaking 
through self-elected representatives.98 
As the Century progressed, those active in the social thought 
movement proposed everything from romantic efforts to reconstruct 
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society by organizing workers of every description into occupational 
groups whose place in the social order would be determined not by 
the capital they owned, but the type and significance of the work 
they performed to society, to attempts to establish a network of 
producer co-operatives, profit sharing schemes, various sorts of 
worker representation schemes,99 and a great deal else.100 Because 
these experiments went forward over a number of decades, they 
changed in response to rapidly changing circumstances and to 
lessons taught through practical failures. 
Regardless of their particular structure and details, however, all 
of the undertakings initiated by Catholic social activists shared three 
essential characteristics that have remained constant themes of the 
social tradition into the present day. Their proposals attempt in some 
way to ground individuals in a group, association or body of some 
sort. These structures provide individuals with defense in depth, 
since they buffer or mediate the relationship between their members 
and the large institutions of the market or the state. At the same time, 
through their involvement in them, each of these mediating structures 
also aims at enhancing the status of individuals by increasing their 
opportunities for effective self-determination, both within and 
without the workplace. Lastly, these mediating bodies tend to 
overlap or dovetail with each other, thereby building-up a new 
ecology of interwoven and interdependent social institutions that 
stand free of the state, and that put an emphasis on self-sufficiency. 
As mentioned, one of the central figures in the formation of the 
social thought tradition and the development of the notion of 
solidarity is Wilhelm Emanuel Freiherr (“Baron”) von Ketteler 
(1811-1877). Trained as a lawyer, he resigned his position in the 
Prussian bureaucracy to protest the Prussian government’s policies 
concerning the church and its jailing of the Archbishop of Cologne, 
and studied for the priesthood. Consecrated as the Bishop of Mainz 
in 1850 when he was just 39 years old, Ketteler played a role in 
several of the significant events of his time. Among many other 
things in the course of a busy life, Ketteler was a delegate to the 
doomed Frankfurter Parliament of 1848 that proposed to give Prussia 
a constitutional monarchy and to guarantee basic civil liberties. Often 
at odds with the Prussian authorities, he was Bismarck’s great 
opponent during the “Kulturkampf” during which he was arrested 
twice. Along with the great British liberal, Lord Acton, Ketteler 
formed part of a minority group opposed to the declaration of papal 
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infallibility by the short-lived First Vatican Council.101 
Ketteler began his long engagement with issues surrounding the 
social question in a series of public lectures he held in 1848, the 
same year that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published The 
Communist Manifesto. Working within a moving viewpoint, 
Ketteler’s positions evolved with time and experience. Deeply 
influenced by the then recently-rediscovered thought of Thomas 
Aquinas, Ketteler also drew from a wide variety of sources, 
including the renowned socialist, Ferdinand Lassalle, with whom 
Ketteler maintained for some time a correspondence, and Viktor 
Aimé Huber, one of the prominent early theorists of the Protestant 
social ethics movement. 
Ketteler’s support for self-organized worker associations, 
producer cooperatives and what now would be called employee 
stock-ownership programs, opening opportunities for worker 
participation in managerial decisionmaking, etc., not only set the 
stage for further developments in the social thought tradition’s 
approach to work-life issues. It also reflects an ongoing and 
overarching concern with encouraging and sustaining mediating 
institutions of all descriptions, including families, social and political 
associations, economic self-help bodies, and other forms of 
sodalities. Ketteler’s interest in promoting a wide-range of 
associational activity, enhancing opportunities for authentic self-
determination and a keen appreciation of the impact of work on 
human character have remained central themes of the social thought 
tradition. 
Despite the role of individuals like Ketteler, however, the social 
thought tradition never has been chiefly a clerically-driven or a 
narrowly sectarian undertaking.  From the start, it has been a 
collaborative project which involved some of the leading figures 
interested in the social question. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville 
actively was engaged with Catholic social thought circles in Paris, 
while Max Weber carried out extensive research on the status of 
agricultural workers under the auspices of the Evangelical (Lutheran) 
Social Congress during the early 1890’s. 
While religiously committed or influenced figures and activists 
have played a leading role in developing the concept of solidarity 
and its associated ideas, solidarity itself is neither an expression of 
religious dogma nor a reflection of sectarian belief. It is a porous 
notion, whose insights draws from the experience of many and are 
available to all. Especially in the United States, however, the 
Catholic social tradition has acted as the prime transmitter of the 
notion and practices of solidarity. That tradition traveled with and 
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spoke first to the large body of Catholic immigrants who came in 
repeated waves to the United States during the Nineteenth Century 
from every part of the European Continent. They used it as a 
framework for the development of a thick web of social institutions 
that established their place in a new world and that assisted them in 
maintaining their identity in the face of an often suspicious, not 
infrequently hostile, and overwhelmingly Protestant American 
public. 
The figure of Peter Dietz provides a good illustration of the ties 
between the social thought tradition, the Catholic immigrant 
community, and the American labor movement. Born of 
impoverished German immigrant parents in New York City in 1878, 
Dietz pursued part of his studies for the priesthood in Germany, 
where he went to familiarize himself with the work of Ketteler and 
his successors. After his return to the United States, Dietz gained 
strong ties to the labor movement and to its predominantly Irish 
Catholic leadership. Over time, he came to enjoy a remarkable 
influence in labor circles and with many in management as well. His 
friend, Samuel Gompers, once informed Dietz that he enjoyed “the 
unique distinction of having secured a reversal of decisions by the 
Executive Board of the AFL [American Federation of Labor].”102 
Through his work with the AFL and numerous other groups, 
Dietz played a major role in translating the first social encyclical, 
Rerum novarum (“On the Condition of Labor”),103 into grass-roots 
action. He also was a precursor for the remarkable line of “labor 
priests,” who, like Dietz, sought to bring the social teachings into 
reality through their involvement in the labor movement. Their 
activities took a wide variety of forms, including an ambitious 
educational effort. For example, by the 1950’s, there were more than 
100 “labor colleges” in the United States conducted by these priests 
and their lay colleagues. Courses in the social teachings, as well as in 
organizing, bargaining, labor law, economics, etc., were all part of 
the standard curriculum in these institutions. Through the decades, 
“labor priests” like Charles Rice (Pittsburgh), John Corridan (New 
York),104 Clement Kern (Detroit), George Higgins (Washington, 
D.C.), and Edward Boyle (Boston), to name just a few, have played 
direct and significant roles in the labor movement and in educating 
the public generally about the Church’s social tradition. 
The influence of the social thought tradition has not only 
occurred at a grass-roots level. It also made itself felt in the New 
Deal legislation of which the National Labor Relations Act was a 
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part. For example, one commentator has described the “Bishops’ 
Program of Social Reconstruction,” promulgated in 1919 in the wake 
of the end of the First World War as “an ambitious statement that 
endorsed a minimum wage, subsidized housing, labor participation in 
industrial management, child labor laws, social insurance for the 
jobless, sick and old-aged, and other reforms—basically, the New 
Deal program, thirteen years before the New Deal.”105 
Priests active in social thought circles also played more direct 
roles in effectuating policies intended to further worker 
representation and civil rights within and without the workplace. For 
instance, a well-known labor arbitrator and social thought theorist, 
Fr. Francis J. Haas, among many other responsibilities, served as one 
of the original members of the State of Wisconsin’s Labor Relations 
Board and as a member of the first National Labor Relations Board. 
Additionally, President Roosevelt appointed him in 1943 the Chair of 
the Fair Employment Practices Commission and in 1947, President 
Truman named him to the President’s Committee on Civil Rights. 
How much direct influence the social thought tradition had on 
Senator Robert Wagner, the author of the National Labor Relations 
Act, is not entirely known. Wagner did, however, carry on an 
extensive correspondence with Fr. Haas and with Fr. John A. Ryan, 
the architect of the 1919 Bishop’s statement and the foremost 
American social thought theorist of his time, often referred to as the 
“Right Reverend New Dealer.” It is also said that the 1931 social 
encyclical, “Quadragesimo anno,” provided Wagner with an 
intellectual framework for his legislative undertakings. We cannot 
know to what degree that is true. Nevertheless, among Wagner’s 
personal papers relating to the NLRA are two heavily annotated and 
underlined copies of the encyclical. 
Certainly, the NLRA is the product of numerous sources, 
movements, experiences and historical accidents.  Nevertheless, 
Fahlbeck is correct when he says that law is “somehow un-
American.” In a real sense, that is true. It is also true, as Fahlbeck 
says, that those “who want and need concerted action” are “not like 
Americans at-large.”107 Historically, a large proportion of them have 
not been, at least not in their attitudes toward community and in the 
way they understand the character of their ties and obligations to 
others. To this subgroup of Americans, solidarity is not an unfamiliar 
term. Instead, it describes the foundations for a rightly-ordered 
world. 
If I am correct about its influence, some of the attitudes that 
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have informed the NLRA might also explain something about the 
difficulties the courts historically have had in interpreting and 
applying the statute’s terms. At least in the case of the United States, 
I think the tension between the courts and labor is less a class-based 
clash than it is a head-on collision between the worlds of Thomas 
Hobbes and Thomas Aquinas. It is little wonder that the attitudes of 
labor often meet with so little comprehension in the minds of the 
judges. In many instances, rulings that appear regrettable or wholly 
inconsistent with the goals of the NLRA are less the product of bad 
faith or willfulness than a function of the encounter of 
incommensurable “faiths.” Until the courts recognize the profound 
differences of the NLRA, they will continue to encounter enormous 
difficulties in construing and applying its terms. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
“To speak about solidarity,” one German scholar recently noted, 
“for some time has appeared to be old fashioned, but it once again 
has become a cutting-edge topic.”108 As its central place in the draft 
European Constitution exemplifies, and as the growing attention paid 
to the topic by scholars in a variety of disciplines suggests, the 
question of solidarity is anything but outmoded. 
The significance of the nation-state is waning, while the 
globalization of the economy has erased boundaries and pushed all of 
us into increasingly closer contact with one another. At the same 
time, mediating institutions and sodalities of every sort are 
weakening. Even social institutions like the family—which since 
ancient times grounded individuals and polities alike—fast are 
disappearing. Across the developed world, the numbers of people 
living alone, in single person “households,” are at the highest levels 
ever recorded, while marriage and birth rates in the developed world 
are at the lowest levels ever seen, even in times of war or famine. 
More people across the world, especially including women, now 
participate in paid or “market” work than at any time in history. In 
addition to all this, the greatest migration of peoples the world has 
ever experienced, from East to West and South to North, is going 
forward. The social tradition and its understandings of solidarity can 
serve as important resources for addressing the challenges that these 
developments pose. In our own “world altogether new,” solidarity is 
not just labor’s question. It is more than ever our issue as well. 
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